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TITLE VII: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE BFOQ
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex discrimina-
tion in employment.' In enacting Title VII Congress undertook to aid
minorities in entering the mainstream of American life by ensuring
that they could compete for jobs on a non-discriminatory basis.' Sec-
tion 703(a) of the Act provides
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . .; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's . . . sex .... '
However, Congress did not prohibit all discrimination on the
basis of sex as was done for discrimination based on race and color.
A statutory exception was created in section 703(e) of the Act which
provides
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his . . . sex...
in those certain instances where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise.'
Thus, there are two basic problems present in any sex-
discrimination case arising under Title VII: Is there in fact sex dis-
crimination, and, if there is, does the discrimination fit within the
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) exception. The scope
of the BFOQ is therefore the key issue in determining to what extent
an employer may discriminate on the basis of sex when he believes
that it will maximize the profits of his business.
It has been said that the underlying policy of Congress in forbid-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 (1970). Title VII was subsequently amended by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp.
1972).
2. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1166 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1970).
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ding sex-based discrimination was to ensure equal access to the job
market for both men and women.5 However, the determination of
what constitutes sex discrimination is difficult to discover because
the addition of sex as a prohibited basis of employment discrimina-
tion came only one day prior to the passage of the entire Act., This
precluded any legislative hearings or significant debate on the scope
of sex discrimination. In addition, the amendment was offered by an
opponent of the measure in an effort to bring about defeat of the
entire bill.7
There is no question that explicit sex discrimination is forbidden
by the Act; that is, sex used as the sole criterion for the employment
determination. It has been suggested that explicit sex discrimination
also includes classification schemes based on physical attributes that
are characteristic of only one sex-such as the ability to become
pregnant.8 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held
that discrimination on the basis of sex plus some other neutral char-
acteristic is a form of unlawful sex discrimination.'
Legislative intent is also lacking concerning the BFOQ excep-
tion. Certain legislators have offered examples of when an employer
could use sexual characteristics, nationality, or religion as a qualifica-
tion for employment: an elderly woman who might want a female
nurse as her attendant;'" a male as a masseur; an all male baseball
team; a French cook in a French restaurant; and a book salesman for
a particular religion. 1 It has been suggested that these examples show
that Congress intended that employers should be able to recognize
certain functional and perhaps cultural differences between the
sexes. These seem to have in common a recognition of the cultural
5. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
6. See Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 882 n.2 (1967).
7. See Comment, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 418; Kanowitz, Sex Based Discrimination in
American Law, 20 HAST. L.J. 305, 311-12 (1968); Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880-83 (1967).
8. See Developments at 1170.
9. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (refused to hire females
with pre-school age children while hiring males with pre-school age children). Also
Congress rejected an amendment which would have limited its scope to discrimination
based solely on sex. See 110 CONG. REc. 2728, 13,825 (1964). In addition, the effect of
the statute is not to be diluted because discrimination affects only a portion of the
protected class. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
10. 110 CONG. REc. 2718 (1964).
11. Id. at 7212-13. The examples come from an interpretative memorandum by
Senators Clark and Case, floor managers of the bill, and these examples illustrate all
three classifications where the BFOQ is applicable - sex, nationality, and religion.
12. See Developments at 1176.
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differences between the sexes based upon customer expectation.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was
given authority to interpret and enforce the provisions of Title VII by
issuing guidelines and decisions interpreting the statute.'3 From the
beginning the BFOQ exception has been interpreted narrowly;"' the
basic tenet being that an employer cannot use a sexual stereotype
about the class to which the employee belongs to evaluate him, but
must instead consider each employee according to his individual cap-
abilities.'5 The EEOC recognizes the applicability of the BFOQ where
necessary only for authenticity or genuineness,' 6 but disapproves the
use of customer preference as a factor in determining the BFOQ.'7
This narrow interpretation of the BFOQ by the EEOC has been
substantially followed by the courts, but the decisions have created
a somewhat broader exception. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
has been instrumental in shaping the judicial interpretation of the
BFOQ. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone Co.,'" the female plain-
tiff had been denied a job as a switchman by the defendant. Southern
Bell admitted its policy of restricting the job of switchman to males
was a prima facie violation of Title VII, but claimed the job fit within
the BFOQ exception because of its strenuous nature." The court
rejected this argument, saying
13. The EEOC was originally vested with investigative and conciliatory powers,
but only limited enforcement authority. The EqualEmployment Opportunity Act of
1972, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. 1972), among other provisions, strength-
ened the EEOC's enforcement powers (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (Supp. 1972)), and
expanded the jurisdictional coverage of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-1 (1972)).
For a good discussion of the amendments, see Sape and Hart, Title VII Reconsidered:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1973). See EEOC Decision No. 71-2088 (1971), CCH
EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 6250; EEOC Decision No. 71-2343, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 6256
(1971); EEOC Decision No. 71-1938, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 6272 (1971); EEOC
Decision No. 71-2040, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 6275 (1971).
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(i)(ii) (1973).
16. 29 C.F.R, § 1604.2(a)(2) (1973).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1973); EEOC Decision No. 71-2343, CCH EMP.
PRAc. GUIDE 6256 (1971). The EEOC also prohibits expense of providing separate
facilities, unless unreasonable, as a factor in considering the BFOQ. See EEOC Deci-
sion No. YNY 9, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 6010 (1969).
18. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
19. A Georgia statute prohibiting women from employment in jobs requiring lift-
ing of objects over 30 pounds was no longer at issue when the case was tried because
the statute had been repealed. Today, state protective legislation for women that in
fact limits their job opportunities, does not give an employer a BFOQ for discrimina-
tory hiring. When these state statutes conflict with Title VII, the state statutes are
invalid, overridden by the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. See
Rosenfield v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). A Louisiana case so
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[llabeling a job as 'strenuous' simply does not meet the burden
of proving that the job is within the BFOQ exception.'"
The test then articulated by the court was that
[iun order to rely on the BFOQ exception, an employer has the
burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe, that
is, a factual basis for believing that all of substantially all women
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the
job involved.2'
Although the court stated that the EEOC guidelines were to be
given great weight, 2 the "all or substantially all" test set forth by the
court does not force an employer to consider each employee individu-
ally-the goal of the EEOC. 3 The Weeks test adapted well to state
protective legislation cases and other situations, but the safety and
efficiency requirements could not answer the problems raised when
customer preference became an issue.
The Weeks test needed refinement which subsequently came in
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.2' At issue in Diaz was Pan
American's rule restricting the position of flight cabin attendant to
females. In the lower court, the defendant introduced testimony by
an expert psychologist concerning the superiority of women in meet-
ing the psychological needs of passengers in the unique environment
of the flight cabin.2 5 Pan American also showed that sex discrimina-
tion was the most efficient screening method in which to find those
employees having the desired personality characteristics for a flight
cabin attendant."0 The district court applied the BFOQ exception,
allowing Pan American to continue their discriminatory hiring prac-
tices."
On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed.28 The court began by look-
ing at the word "necessary" within the BFOQ exception and created
a business necessity test rather than a business convenience test.
holding was LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971).
This is in accord with the EEOC guidelines (29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (1972)). For a good
discussion of state protective legislation and Title VII, see Comment, 24 ALA. L. REv.
567 (1972).
20. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir. 1969).
21. Id. at 235.
22. Id.
23. See text at note 15 supra.
24. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
25. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
26. Id. at 565.
27. Id. at 569.
28. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
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Discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members
of one sex exclusively."
Having made the essence of an employer's business the key to lawful
discrimination, the court decided that "[t]he primary function of an
airline is to transfer passengers from one point to another," and thus
the personality and psychological attributes of females were only
"tangential" to the business enterprise rather than "essential. '30
Therefore, the requisite business necessity for hiring only females was
lacking.
The court also considered the Weeks test, and decided that Pan
American had not carried their burden of proving that "all or sub-
stantially all" men could not perform the requisite job function of a
flight cabin attendant.3 Turning to the issue of customer preference,
the court adopted the EEOC guidelines which prohibit consideration
of customer preference in determining the application of the BFOQ.32
The court said the guidelines were entitled to great deference33 but
added
customer preference may be taken into account only when it is
based on the company's inability to perform the primary function
or service it offers.3 4
For an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex, Diaz requires
proof of a business necessity, which is present only when the essence
of the employer's business is involved. Thus, the determination of the
essence of an employer's business becomes the key to the sex discrim-
ination issue. It has been suggested, however, that consideration of
customer preference will be involved in the process of deciding what
the essence of the employer's business is as reflected in a particular
occupation.35
In Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,36 the Fifth
Circuit held that an employer's grooming code which prohibits long
hair on males while allowing it on females is an unlawful form of sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII. While becoming the first
29. Id. at 388.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 389.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Oldham, Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under Title VII-"Sex-
Plus" and the BFOQ, 23 HAST. L.J. 55, 90 (1971).
36. 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973), rehearing en banc granted, Sept. 5, 1973.
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appellate court to hold that differentiation in hair lengths is sex-
based discrimination,37 the court remanded the case to the lower
court to determine if the grooming code was a BFOQ for the position
which the plaintiff was applying."
On remanding the case the court stated that community reaction
to long hair was pertinent to the BFOQ defense rather than the issue
of whether the grooming code was sex discrimination.3 9 This recogni-
tion of the applicability of community reaction-or customer prefer-
ence-to the BFOQ exception seems to be more in line with the
court's prior language in Diaz and legislative intent 40 than the
EEOC's rejection of customer preference as a consideration.
The Fifth Circuit in Diaz said that customer preference could not
justify sex discrimination because the job aspects in question were
merely "tangential" to the airline's business. It has been suggested
that this language implies that with regard to the functions that are
"necessary" or "central" to the job, demonstrable customer prefer-
ence may justify sex discrimination .4 The court in Willingham seems
to agree by allowing an examination of customer preference where the
job in question-an advertising position-could well be deemed es-
sential to the operation of a newspaper.
Furthermore, the lower court in Diaz stated that the Clark-Case
Memorandum" with examples of the BFOQ (all male baseball team,
French cook, religious salesman) showed that customer preference
37. The United States District Courts have divided on the issue. Accord, Aros v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Donohue v. Shoe Corp.
of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Roberts v. General Mills, Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971). Contra, Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402
(D.D.C. 1972); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235 (C.D. Cal. 1972);
Dodge v. Giant Foods, Inc., 3 Emp. Prac. Decisions 8184 (D.D.C. 1971). For a good
discussion of these cases, see Note, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 965 (1973). The EEOC says that
the differentiation is unlawful discrimination. EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, CCH EMP.
PRAC. GUIDE 6231 (1971); EEOC Decision No. 72-1380, CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE
6364 (1972); EEOC Decision No. 72-1931, CCH EMP. PRAC. Guide 6373 (1972)
(Refusal to hire long-haired applicants where long haired females were hired consti-
tutes discrimination in the absence of showing a business necessity.)
38. Willingham was applying for position as display or layout artist in the retail
advertising department of the Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.
39. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 482 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1973),
rehearing en banc granted, Sept. 5, 1973.
40. See text at note 12 supra.
41. See Hillman, Sex and Employment Under the Equal Rights Amendment, 67
Nw. U.L. REV. 789, 822 (1973).
42. See text at note 11 supra. An examination of all examples given for the BFOQ,
even those for religion and nationality, more clearly point to Congressional recognition
of customer preference.
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was a valid ingredient of the BFOQ. 3 The Fifth Circuit in Diaz
avoided discussing the memorandum, but it has been suggested that
the lower court was correct, and the examples do contemplate cus-
tomer preference in determining the BFOQ." Thus the approach of
the court in Willingham does seem to be responsive to Congressional
intent.
There remains the problem of the EEOC guidelines and the
weight given them. The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 5
said to give deference to the guidelines, and also that "[s]ince the
Act and its legislative history support the Commission's construction,
this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will
of Congress."" Thus, the Court's deference was related to its agree-
ment with the EEOC on the merits. Deference, therefore, would not
preclude an independent examinationof the conformity of the guide-
lines to Congressional intent. 7 It seems that the court in Willingham
has come closer to following Congressional intent than the EEOC
guidelines by allowing the consideration of customer preference.
Title VII prohibits sex-based discrimination in employment, yet
Congress inserted a statutory exception that allows discrimination on
the basis of sex in certain instances. To ensure Congress' goal of equal
access to the job market for men and women, the exception must be
construed narrowly. However, examination of customer preference
when the job aspect in question is essential to the employer's business
is consistent with Congressional intent and will not so undermine the
statute so as to defeat the legislative purpose in enacting it. This
interpretation will help balance the right of the employee to equal
employment opportunity and that of the employer to make the deci-
sions that he believes will maximize the profits of his business.
John F. Cassibry
43. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559, 568 (1970).
44: See Oldham, Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under Title VII-"Sex-
Plus" and the BFOQ, 23 HAST. L.J. 55, 90 (1971).
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
46. Id. at 434.
47. See Note, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 965, 976 n.61 (1973).
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